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DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: A COMPARISON OF ITALIAN AND UK 
NON-FINANCIAL LISTED FIRMS’ DISCLOSURE 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Directors’ remuneration is a key issue for both academics and policymakers. It has caused enormous 
controversy in recent years. This study uses a comprehensive index to analyse the disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration in Italian and UK listed firms. It finds that the level of voluntary disclosure is 
significantly associated with firm-specific incentives, such as the demand for information from 
investors and the need for legitimacy. It finds that the level of voluntary disclosure is significantly 
higher in the UK than in Italy and that firm-specific incentives to disclose voluntary information differ 
according to the institutional setting in which a firm operates. In the UK, firm-specific incentives 
mostly come from the demand for information, estimated with the level of ownership diffusion, and 
the need for legitimacy generated by poor market performance and shareholders’ dissent. In Italy, 
firm-specific incentives seem to be represented by the need for legitimacy generated by media 
coverage. This study also provides evidence that, in both countries, the information disclosed in 
corporate documents does not allow readers to obtain a comprehensive picture of directors’ 
remuneration. Bonuses are poorly disclosed even though they are a key element of directors’ 
remuneration. This finding is clearly important for policymakers at European and national level.    
Keywords: agency theory, directors’ remuneration, disclosure, legitimacy theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Directors’ remuneration aims to align the interests of directors with those of shareholders, 
thereby reducing agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1l976). However, directors’ 
remuneration, of itself, could give rise to agency problems (Bebchuk et al., 2002). This is one 
of the key areas where directors may have a conflict of interest and where due account should 
be taken of the interests of shareholders (EU Commission, 2004). Controversy surrounding 
directors’ remuneration reflects the perception that payments have been excessive and that 
the lack of timely and adequate disclosure has resulted in increased information asymmetry 
and rent-extraction (Bebchuk et al., 2002, Jensen et al., 2004). The demand for public 
disclosure arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between directors and 
outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Disclosure on directors’ remuneration would help 
to resolve such problems. It can reduce information asymmetry on complex remuneration 
arrangements that can be an important mechanism to transfer wealth from shareholders to 
directors (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Laksmana, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010). Moreover, directors’ 
remuneration has been blamed for playing a central role in many international corporate 
scandals, as well as having been a key factor that contributed to the global financial crisis 
(e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, 2005). Consequently, regulators have been concerned that directors 
should be accountable to shareholders by disclosing their remuneration policies. In particular, 
the EU Commission (2004; 2009) has issued two non-binding recommendations to its 
country members. Therefore, directors’ remuneration disclosure is a topic relevant to both 
academics and policymakers. It also provides an appropriate setting to examine the disclosure 
of board practices and investigate potential drivers for providing voluntary disclosure 
(Laksmana, 2008). 
By analysing a sample of 234 size- and industry-paired Italian and UK non-financial listed 
firms in 2009, this paper achieves two purposes. First, it explores how directors’ 
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remuneration practices1 are disclosed in two major European economies, the UK and Italy, by 
developing a comprehensive disclosure index. Greater transparency enables shareholders to 
monitor the relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm performance better and to 
verify whether remuneration is effectively designed to align directors’ and shareholders’ 
interests (Craighead et al., 2004; Laksmana 2008; Laksmana et al., 2012). Second, this paper 
investigates which factors are associated with the level of voluntary disclosure provided by 
firms. It finds that both country-level and firm-specific factors, such as the demand for 
information from outside shareholders and the firms’ need for legitimacy, are significantly 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration. 
Italy and the UK were chosen because they can be characterised as being at opposite ends of 
a spectrum. UK firms are considered as having the best practices in Europe (e.g., 
RiskMetrics, 2009; Ferrarini et al., 2010), while Italian firms have been seen as exemplifying 
bad practice (La Porta et al., 1998; Patel et al., 2003; Ferrarini et al., 2010). UK listed firms 
are usually seen as having an agency problem between executives and shareholders (Mallin, 
2010), while Italian listed firms are characterized by an agency problem between controlling 
and outside shareholders (Melis, 2000). These different agency problems might have 
different influences on disclosure practices (e.g., Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). While the UK 
belongs to the common law group of countries, generally characterised by high disclosure, 
Italy is included in the civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1999), which are characterised as 
oriented toward “legal compliance”, with low disclosure (e.g., Meek & Thomas, 2004). 
Finally, Italy and the UK provide a distinct institutional setting in which to study the 
influence played by shareholders’ votes on directors’ remuneration disclosure, as they are 
among the few countries in which listed companies are mandated to let shareholders vote on 
directors’ remuneration (‘Say on pay’). However, this shareholder vote on remuneration has 
mainly an advisory role (UK Company Act 2006, Italian Civil code, art. 2363 bis). 
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Our study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature in four ways.  
First, by focusing on directors’ remuneration disclosure it examines a voluntary disclosure 
decision that reflects a potential conflict of interest between directors and outside 
shareholders (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2002). By contrast, most of the extant literature focuses on 
the explanations for disclosure where shareholders’ and directors’ interests are not likely to 
be in conflict (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Patel et al., 2003; 
Prencipe, 2004; Markarian et al., 2007).   
Second, this study extends the emerging literature on voluntary disclosure on directors’ 
remuneration (e.g., Byrd et al., 1998; Laksmana, 2008; Schiehll et al., 2013). We developed a 
more comprehensive disclosure index than those used in previous studies (Laksmana, 2008; 
Liu & Taylor, 2008). This covers all the relevant directors’ remuneration components, as 
confirmed by active institutional investors. By contrast, previous studies mainly focused on 
specific remuneration components, such as share-based remuneration (Liu & Taylor, 2008; 
Schiehll et al., 2013), termination payments (Liu & Taylor, 2008), and remuneration peer 
groups (Byrd et al., 1998).  
Third, by conducting a comparative analysis, this paper explores the potential variation of 
directors’ remuneration disclosure in two major European economies and contributes to the 
debate on whether voluntary disclosure is associated with country-level characteristics and/or 
firm-specific factors (e.g., Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; 
Durnev & Kim, 2005; Doidge et al., 2007). It provides new evidence that voluntary 
disclosure is driven by a combination of institutional and firm-specific factors. 
Fourth, by shedding light on directors’ remuneration disclosure in European firms, this study 
contributes to our understanding of the extent to which the findings of previous studies, 
which mainly focused on US firms (e.g., Byrd et al., 1998; Laksmana, 2008), can be 
generalised in other institutional settings. This paper shows that previous findings related to 
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US firms are mainly confirmed in an institutional setting which shares similar characteristics 
(e.g. Anglo-American market-oriented setting, like the UK), but are less applicable to a non-
Anglo-American institutional setting (e.g. relationship-based setting, like Italy). This result 
represents an important contribution to the more generic corporate disclosure literature (e.g. 
Marston & Shrives, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Giner Inchausti, 1997; Archambault & 
Archambault, 2003; Patel et al., 2003; Prencipe; 2004; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Markarian 
et al., 2007). The demand for information is an important driver for voluntary disclosure only 
in Anglo-American settings, while its importance in other institutional settings seems to be 
limited. Although the extent of voluntary disclosure is associated with the search for 
legitimacy in both institutional settings, this paper shows that the drivers of the need for 
legitimacy are not universal, but are related to the institutional context a firm operates in.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section covers the literature review 
and the development of the hypotheses. We then outline our research methodology, followed 
by the data analysis and the empirical findings. Concluding remarks, policy implications and 
limitations of the paper are presented in the final section. 
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses’ development 
According to Verrecchia (2001) a comprehensive theory of voluntary disclosure does not 
exist, with the only wholly unifying assumption among different theories being that any firm 
contemplating making a disclosure is likely to disclose information that is favourable to the 
firm and is unlikely to disclose information that is unfavourable to the firm (Dye, 2001). The 
incentives to disclose information voluntarily can be explained in terms of economics-based 
as well as system-based theories (e.g., Cormier et al., 2005; Cotter et al., 2011; Beattie & 
Smith, 2012). Those theories are, to an extent, mutually consistent, overlapping and 
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potentially complementary (e.g., Cormier et al., 2005; Broberg et al., 2010; Beattie & Smith, 
2012).  
Instead of relying on a single theoretical background, we, therefore, adopt multi-theoretical 
lenses that rely on economic incentives, legitimacy needs and institutional factors to explain 
the extent of directors’ remuneration disclosure. 
In providing voluntary disclosure, a firm is subject to three levels of potential influence 
(Cormier et al., 2005). Senior management is directly accountable towards its investors. 
Hence, we rely on agency theory to investigate whether managers provide information 
voluntarily to reduce the information asymmetry with investors. At the same time, a firm 
operates within a broader societal context and its activities affect a wide range of other 
stakeholders. Senior management is also accountable towards the society. Hence, firms may 
disclose voluntary information not only to reduce the information asymmetry, but also to gain 
and maintain legitimacy in society. Legitimacy theory suggests that the extent of a firm 
voluntary disclosure is a response to public pressure. In determining voluntary disclosure, 
corporate insiders consider a firm’s institutional context. Organizational practices (such as 
disclosure practices) do not develop in a vacuum, as firms are embedded in a nexus of formal 
and informal rules. A firmV voluntary disclosures are is rather the result of macro social 
processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The needs of a firm for legitimacy depend on the 
characteristics of the institutional setting in which a firm operates (e.g., Suchman, 1995; 
Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004). Similarly, agency theory can incorporate an institutional 
perspective, thereby giving explicit recognition to the social contexts surrounding agency 
relations (Wiseman et al 2012). Although agency problems (information asymmetry, conflict 
of interest, and opportunistic agent behaviour) are universal, the explicit manifestation of 
these problems (and the ways to deal with them) may vary depending on the institutional 
context in which a firm operates (Wiseman et al., 2012). Therefore, both country-level 
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institutional characteristics and firm-specific factors may influence the level of voluntary 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration. Previous studies which found that firm-specific factors 
influence corporate disclosure did not take into account potential differences in country-level 
institutional characteristics (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Giner Inchausti, 1997; Cheng & Courtenay, 
2006; Laksmana, 2008). Therefore, building on previous literature on remuneration 
disclosure (e.g., Byrd et al. 1998, Laksmana, 2008, Liu & Taylor 2008; Laksmana et al., 
2012; Schiehll et al., 2013), we derive our hypotheses from agency theory and legitimacy 
theory, adopting both country-level and firm-specific considerations. 
 
2.1. Voluntary disclosure and country-level institutional characteristics. 
Disclosure practices reflect the underlying environmental influences that affect firms in 
different countries (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Archambault & 
Archambault, 2003; Doidge et al., 2007). There are two main corporate systems in developed 
economies: relationship-based and market-oriented (e.g., Weimer & Pape, 1999; Clarke, 
2007). When compared to the relationship-based system, the market-oriented system is 
characterized by a relatively large equity market (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999), a higher capital 
market orientation (e.g., Pagano et al., 1998), and a more active takeover market (Weimer & 
Pape, 1999). These characteristics produce a higher need for firms to provide information to 
‘anonymous’ investors at a distance (Ball et al., 2000). As the market needs information, the 
power of the market depends on information availability. Disclosure is thus one of the 
cornerstones for effective, market-based control mechanisms. Indeed, Markarian et al. (2007) 
found that, although disclosure practices have been converging, there are still significant 
differences in disclosure characteristics across corporate systems. Moreover, firms in market-
oriented systems have a higher level of disclosure.  
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International taxonomies list Italy as a relationship-based corporate system, while the UK 
belongs to a market-oriented corporate system (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Clarke, 2007). 
Hence, we expect that: 
 
H1: The extent of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration is higher in UK firms than 
in Italian firms. 
 
2.2. Voluntary disclosure and firm-specific incentives.  
2.2.1 Voluntary disclosure and the demand for information. 
Agency theory suggests that the potential for agency costs arises in firms characterised by a 
separation of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In firms with dispersed 
ownership the potential for conflict between principal and agent is greater than in firms with 
concentrated ownership. Firms with more dispersed shareholders have a larger number of 
shareholders who are not directly involved in the management of the firm and, consequently, 
the agency costs due to information asymmetry between shareholders and corporate insiders 
are higher (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The demand and, therefore, the supply of quality 
information will be high in firms owned by widely-dispersed shareholders (Kothari, 2001). 
The annual report is typically the main source of information for such outside shareholders 
(Lang & Lundholm, 1996). In contrast to firms with widely-dispersed ownership, the 
presence of controlling shareholders overcomes some of the principal–agent problems since 
controlling shareholders have the power to influence the board decision-making process 
(Melis, 2000). Thus, in such firms, information is mainly transferred from management to 
controlling shareholders through informal channels rather than via the annual report (Berglöf 
& Pajuste, 2005). As a result, disclosure is likely to be greater in widely-held firms (Kothari, 
2001) and ownership diffusion is expected to be positively associated with voluntary 
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disclosure (Raffournier, 1995; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Prencipe, 2004; Patelli & Prencipe, 
2007; Chizema, 2008). Hence, we expect that:  
 
H2a: The extent of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration is positively related to the 
level of ownership diffusion. 
 
Although the demand for information is higher when ownership is widespread, because of the 
lack of close monitoring, directors could opportunistically reduce the information disclosed to 
hide details of their own remuneration packages from shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2002). 
The presence of outside shareholders could, however, increase the level of disclosure as such 
shareholders may have the interest to monitor directors. Unlike the controlling shareholders, 
outside shareholders are not able to get information via private channels, but need the 
information to be disclosed in public documents, such as the annual report. Both UK and 
Italian firms must subject directors’ remuneration to a shareholders’ vote (‘Say on pay’) (UK 
Company Act 2006, Italian Civil code, art. 2363 bis). After analysing the publicly disclosed 
information, shareholders can give an opinion on directors’ remuneration. The demand for 
information on directors’ remuneration is likely to be higher for companies in which outside 
shareholders are able to vote on the resolution to approve directors’ remuneration (Mangen & 
Magnan, 2012). Hence, we expect that:  
 
H2b: The extent of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration is positively related to the 
level of outside shareholders’ attendance at the shareholders’ general meeting that approved 
directors’ remuneration. 
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2.2.2 Voluntary disclosure and the need for legitimacy. 
Voluntary disclosure can be provided by firms to achieve legitimacy (e.g., Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975; Liu & Taylor, 2008). Legitimacy theory argues that the greater the likelihood 
of negative social perceptions of a firm’s activities, the greater the firm’s desire to gain or 
retain legitimacy.  Firms seeking legitimacy try to ensure that they operate within the norms 
of their respective societies by adopting strategies and practices that conform with societal 
norms, values, and expectations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).   
The disclosure of voluntary information in annual reports is an important communication 
strategy that allows firms, which want to gain or retain legitimacy, to potentially influence 
public opinion (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Legitimacy is usually associated with highly 
contested topics such as social and environmental disclosure (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; 
Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Patten, 1992; Tilt, 1994; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000) and derivatives 
(Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004). However, firms are also sensitive to stakeholder criticism of 
remuneration-related issues (e.g., Murphy, 1996). It, therefore, follows that more detailed 
information on directors’ remuneration will be provided by firms to obtain legitimacy 
(Chizema, 2008; Liu & Taylor, 2008).  
There are several situations that could create greater firm-specific incentives for legitimacy 
through voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration. Directors of firms subject to greater 
public scrutiny are more interested in obtaining and/or retaining legitimacy. The media can 
create an awareness of legitimacy threatening issues. Companies with negative coverage 
about a specific issue are likely to respond to this media by providing more public 
information on the specific issue (e.g., Brown & Deegan, 1998; Liu & Taylor, 2008; 
Laksmana, 2008). Thus, a greater level of media coverage paid to directors’ remuneration 
could lead firms to enhance their level of voluntary disclosure on this issue. Hence, we expect 
that:  
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H3a: The extent of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration is positively related to the 
level of related media coverage on such issue. 
 
Firms with highly-remunerated CEOs are likely to be exposed to public scrutiny. As 
excessive remuneration has been blamed for being one reason for the recent financial crisis, 
increases in CEO remuneration could draw external attention to the firm’s remuneration 
policies. Firms which pay high remuneration packages may thus have the incentives to 
provide more detailed information about directors’ remuneration in order to justify not only 
the level of CEO remuneration but also any increases in CEO remuneration (Wade et al., 
1997; Liu et al., 2006). Hence, we expect that:  
 
H3b: The extent of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration is positively related to the 
level of CEO remuneration. 
H3c: The extent of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration is positively related to any 
increases in the level of CEO remuneration. 
 
Much of the concern with remuneration is driven by shareholders’ demands that CEOs 
should be compensated on the basis of the firm’s financial performance (Wade et al., 1997). 
Poorly-performing firms are subject to greater market pressure as they have eroded 
shareholders’ value. Poorly-performing firms, therefore, need to provide more justification 
for the remuneration paid to their directors (e.g., Wade et al., 1997). As the media focuses 
particular attention on listed firms’ market performance, to reduce potential negative 
publicity, poorly performing firms have incentives to provide more disclosure. Hence, we 
expect that:  
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H3d: The extent of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration is negatively related to 
the level of firm’s market performance. 
 
Outside shareholders’ dissent on remuneration resolutions may cause ‘outrage’ (Bebchuk et 
al., 2002; Mangen & Magnan, 2012). Proposals on directors’ remuneration at the 
shareholders’ meeting will draw remuneration to the attention of the shareholders. Therefore, 
firms have incentives to enhance the level of directors’ remuneration disclosure in the annual 
report so as to reduce potential further ‘outrage’ (Liu & Taylor, 2008). Hence, we expect that: 
 
H3e: The extent of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration is positively related to the 
presence of outside shareholders' dissenting votes on remuneration resolution. 
 
3. Data and research method 
3.1 Sample and data gathering  
The sample comprises non-financial Italian and UK firms listed, respectively, on the Milan 
and London Stock Exchange in 2009. Financial firms were eliminated in view of their sector-
specific peculiarities (e.g., Giner Inchausti, 1997). 2009 was selected because, at the time of 
data collection, it was the most recent period for which annual reports were available. We 
identified 235 Italian non-financial firms and 1,528 UK non-financial firms. Fifteen Italian 
firms and 861 UK firms whose financial year did not end on December 31st were eliminated 
from the analysis, to assure the comparability of the results, leaving a sample of 220 Italian 
and 667 UK firms. In order to facilitate comparisons between Italian and UK firms, we 
matched them pairwise (e.g., Bozzolan et al., 2003). As previous studies found that firm size 
and industry (Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989, 1992; Wallace & Naser, 1995, Raffournier, 1995; 
Botosan, 1997; Giner Inchausti, 1997; Robb et al., 2001; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2005) affect 
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the level of voluntary disclosure, the sample was selected so that UK and Italian firms were 
not significantly different from each other in terms of industry and size. Both sets of firms 
were classified according to the two-digit SIC code industry and market capitalisation at 31-
12-2008 (as a proxy for firm size), leaving a final sample of 117 firms for each country (see 
table 1 for a description of the sample characteristics). 
We investigated remuneration disclosure by analysing corporate annual reports, corporate 
governance reports and, when publicly available, directors’ remuneration reports. We also 
analysed regulatory filings when available. All the above mentioned information was usually 
part of the annual report. 
Data about industry, market capitalisation and financial analysts’ coverage were collected 
from the Thomson One Banker database. Data about ownership diffusion were manually-
collected from annual reports for UK firms and gathered from the Consob database for Italian 
firms. Market performance, profitability and financial leverage were collected from the 
Amadeus database. Data about shareholders’ attendance and dissenting votes on the 
remuneration resolution at the shareholder meeting were gathered from the Manifest database 
for UK firms and were manually-collected from the minutes of the shareholders’ meetings for 
Italian firms. CEO remuneration data was manually-collected from annual reports. Data 
about media coverage were collected from the Factiva database.  
 
3.2. Directors’ disclosure remuneration: regulatory framework 
Voluntary disclosure is any information not included in legal mandatory requirements (i.e. 
information disclosed beyond mandatory disclosure requirements in the form of laws, stock 
exchange listing rules, and/or accounting regulations). In 2009 Italian listed firms were 
required to provide details on the remuneration received by each director (in terms of salary, 
benefits in-kind, bonus) and on share-based payments. For share-based payments, they had to 
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disclose the amount of options/shares held by each director (at the start and end of the year) 
and of options which were granted, exercised and had expired during the year as well as the 
characteristics of all the existing share-based payments. Moreover, they were also required to 
provide information on the directors’ termination payments (TUF2, art. 123-bis). 
Directors’ remuneration disclosure regulation in the UK differs for FTSE and AIM firms.  
In 2009, FTSE firms were required to present a directors’ remuneration report in which they 
provided information on directors’ remuneration policy, service contract, as well as details of 
the remuneration received by each director (in terms of salary, bonus, benefit and termination 
payment) and the characteristics of the pension schemes. They also had to disclose the 
characteristics of share-based payments granted or exercised during the year and those 
unexpired at the end of the year.  
AIM firms are regulated by specific London Stock Exchange rules that, in 2009, did not 
regulate disclosure of directors’ remuneration. Nor was the Combined Code (2008) 
applicable to AIM firms. Thus, all information provided in AIM firms’ annual reports on 
directors’ remuneration was voluntary3.  
Both Italian and UK FTSE listed firms were mandated to let shareholders’ vote on the 
directors’ remuneration (‘Say on pay’) (UK Company Act 2006, Italian Civil code, art. 2363 
bis). The shareholders’ vote had mainly an advisory role, as firms were not mandated to 
implement the results of the “Say on pay” votes. In the UK, ‘Say on pay’ was voluntary for 
AIM firms.  
 
3.3 Disclosure index 
The extent of disclosure has been measured on a quantitative basis using disclosure indices. 
Although disclosure is an abstract concept that cannot be measured directly (Marston & 
Shrives, 1991), such indices are able to provide an indirect, if subjective, measure of the 
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underlying concept. Their validity has been demonstrated not only by the consistent results 
documented by previous studies on the determinants of the level of disclosure (Ahmed & 
Courtis, 1999), but also by specific analyses carried out to assess their  validity (Botosan, 
1997). A disclosure index is usually constructed as a function of the number of the items 
provided in the annual reports (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Prencipe, 2004). The absence of an 
official index for directors’ remuneration disclosure did not allow us to use a publicly 
available ranking. Moreover, evaluations of firm disclosure practices by professional firms, 
such as Standard and Poor’s, are provided upon firm’s request, introducing a self-selection 
bias into the sample (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006).   
We thus used a self-constructed disclosure index (Botosan, 1997, Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; 
Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). We tested the proposed disclosure index for validity (i.e. the ability 
of the index to truly capture what is intended) and reliability (i.e. the replication of the 
measurement process) (Cooke and Wallace, 1989; Marston and Shrives, 1991). Following 
previous studies (e.g., Raffounier, 1995; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007; Laksmana, 2008), to limit 
subjectivity, the selection of items included in the directors’ remuneration disclosure 
checklist was guided by the 2004 and 2009 EU non-mandatory recommendations for 
disclosure, which embrace both Italian and UK firms. The validity of the index was further 
tested by sending the disclosure index to three leading international institutional investors 
active in directors’ remuneration (Calpers, Hermes, and Standard Life) and discussing with 
them the relevance of the items to be included. Although institutional investors are not the 
only stakeholders, information considered relevant for them is also relevant for other 
stakeholders (IASB, 1989). Validity has been further tested by measuring if there is a 
significant correlation between the measure adopted (the disclosure index) and an 
independent, but related, external criterion (Litwin, 1995: 37). In this case, we checked if the 
disclosure index was correlated with financial analysts’ coverage (estimated as the number of 
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financial analysts that published at least one report, during the previous financial year, on the 
firm analysed). Financial analysts’ coverage has been proven to have an endogenous relation 
with a firm disclosure (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995; Lang & Lundholm, 1996).  
We searched the annual reports (both English and domestic language) for the 67 possible 
attributes in our disclosure index divided into the following broad categories: a) remuneration 
policy (4 items); b) design of salary and fees (2 items); c) design of bonus (10 items); d) 
design of share-based payments (34 items); e) design of pension schemes (2 items); f) design 
of executive contracts and termination payments (3 items); g) remuneration paid to each 
director (11), and h) the presence of a remuneration section in the annual report (1 item) 4.  
The following procedure was used to score the items: 1 if there was extensive disclosure, 0.5 
if it was partially disclosed, zero if it was not disclosed (Robb et al., 2001; Bassett et al., 
2007). A not-applicable code (N/A) was adopted when a firm did not disclose an item 
because there was no reason to disclose it. For example, if the firm disclosed that it did not 
grant any share-based plan (SBP), we codified the item “No of SBPs granted during the year” 
as 1, because the company disclosed the information required. We then considered not 
applicable for that firm all the items that required details of the SBPs granted during the year 
(“exercise price”, “vesting period” of SBPs granted during the year, etc.) as there is no 
reason to disclose such information. Not-applicable items were excluded when calculating the 
maximum possible score (Botosan, 1997; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007; Teixeira Lopes & Lima 
Rodrigues, 2007; Allegrini & Greco, 2013). Firms were, therefore, not penalised if a 
disclosure item was not relevant to them. When in doubt, we kept the item. Although this 
process contains elements of subjectivity, the resulting bias is probably lower than if we had 
included potentially non-relevant items (Lim et al., 2007; Teixeira Lopes & Lima Rodrigues, 
2007). 
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Data collection and analysis were conducted by three researchers. The first phase of data 
collection involved defining the recording unit. Sentences were chosen as recording units 
because they were considered more reliable than pages or paragraphs (Hackston & Milne, 
1996). The second phase consisted of defining of a coding procedure to capture directors’ 
remuneration disclosure. A list of identification and classification rules was elaborated 
defining classification criteria for each item. Explanatory notes on the content of each 
category-item and examples of sentences to be coded in each category-item were prepared 
and discussed before the beginning of the analysis (Bozzolan et al., 2003). A preliminary test 
was conducted to align the set of coding rules among different coders (inter-coder reliability). 
Six annual reports (three published by Italian firms and three by UK firms) were initially 
examined independently by three researchers to ensure that the classification criteria were 
standardised across the researchers. Subsequently, three annual reports were classified 
independently by two researchers. The results of the individual classifications were compared 
by the third researcher, who identified misalignments. Discrepancies were re-analysed and 
resolved by discussion between the three researchers (e.g., Lee, 1999; Markarian et al., 2007). 
Following this procedure a final set of coding rules was defined. As two coders worked 
separately, a third researcher assessed the accuracy and consistency of their coding. 
The sets of data coded by the two researchers were matched so as to assess the reliability of 
the coding procedure (inter-coder reliability). Inter-coder reliability was measured by using 
both the percentage of agreement index (e.g., Markarian et al., 2007) and Cohen’s kappa 
agreement index (Cohen, 1960) in order to overcome the limits intrinsic in each individual 
index (Lombard et al., 2002). 
We computed an index of disclosure (TDI) for each firm, calculated as the ratio of the actual 
score awarded to the firm i divided by the maximum possible potential score applicable to 
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that firm (Raffounier, 1995; Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 
2005; Bassett et al., 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). In particular: 
∑
∑
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where TDIi  is the disclosure index of the firm i;  dij is the value for a disclosure index item j, 
for firm i; mj is the number of disclosure items which are relevant to firm i and were actually 
disclosed, and nj is the maximum number of disclosure items that can be disclosed by firm i 
given the elements in the directors’ remuneration package. The total available scores exclude 
items that are not applicable to an individual firm. This exclusion, together with the 
proportional score approach, allows comparable disclosure scores to be constructed for each 
firm (e.g., Bassett et al., 2007). 
In similar way to the total disclosure index (TDI), the voluntary disclosure index (VDI) was 
calculated on the voluntary disclosure items (vdij) as a proportion of the maximum possible 
potential score, excluding items not applicable to an individual firm. 
The results of the analysis of inter-coder reliability, measured with the percentage of 
agreement and the Cohen’s kappa scores, are above the appropriate minimum acceptable 
levels (90 percent and 0.8 respectively). Both disclosure indices were also found to be 
significantly correlated with financial analysts’ coverage (0.35, p < 0.001). We can thus 
conclude that the total and the voluntary disclosure indices are both reliable and valid. 
 
3.3 Models, dependent and independent variables 
3.3.1. Models 
In order to contribute to the debate regarding the role of country-level characteristics and 
firm-specific factors in influencing firms’ disclosure, we followed Doidge et al. (2007) and 
estimated the following hierarchical cross-sectional regression models:   
19 
 
(1) ii0i εCountryδαVDI ++=  
(2) 
iii7i6
i5i4i3
i2i10i
εvariablesControlγvotesDissentingβeperformancMarketβ
changeonremuneratiCeoβonremuneratiCeoβcoverageMediaβ
attendancers'shareholdeOutsideβdiffusionOwnershipβαVDI
++++
++++
+++=
 
(3)
ii
ii7i6
i5i4i3
i2i10i
εCountry
variablesControlγvotesDissentingβeperformancMarketβ
changeonremuneratiCeoβonremuneratiCeoβcoverageMediaβ
attendancers'shareholdeOutsideβdiffusionOwnershipβαVDI
+∂+
++++
++++
+++=
 
where i = firm; β = the coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the voluntary disclosure 
index to the firm-level characteristics considered as independent variables; γ = the coefficient 
that measures the sensitivity of the voluntary disclosure index to the firm-level characteristics 
considered as control variables; and δ = the coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the 
voluntary disclosure index to the country-level characteristics.  
Following Doidge et al. (2007), we first estimated the importance of country-specific 
characteristics on voluntary disclosure, by projecting the voluntary disclosure index on the 
country dummy variable (model 1). Then we estimated the importance of firm-specific 
characteristics on voluntary disclosure, by analysing the effect of firm-level variables on 
firm’s voluntary disclosure (see model 2). The firm-specific variables used in this model 
estimate the firm-specific demand for information (H2) and need for legitimacy (H3) while 
controlling for several firm-specific factors that have been shown to be significant according 
to the voluntary disclosure literature. In model 3, we estimated regressions of firm voluntary 
disclosure on both sets of country-level and firm-specific characteristics. Building the 
regression models hierarchically allows us to evaluate whether country-level and firm-
specific variables are jointly significant, by comparing the adjusted R-square of the three 
models.  
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In addition, because of the different institutional characteristics of Italy and the UK, we test 
our hypotheses on the Italian and the UK sub-samples to investigate whether the influence of 
firm-specific factors is different in the two institutional settings analysed.  
3.3.2. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the voluntary disclosure index (VDI): 
∑
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where VDIi  is the voluntary disclosure index of the firm i; vdij is the value for a voluntary 
disclosure index item j, for firm i; mj is the number of voluntary disclosure items which are 
relevant to firm i and were actually disclosed, and nj is the maximum number of voluntary 
disclosure items that can be disclosed by firm i given the elements that are included in the 
directors’ remuneration package.  
 
3.3.3. Independent variables 
To test our hypotheses we use the following independent variables: 
Country = a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the firm is based in the UK, and 0 if it is 
based in Italy. 
Ownership diffusion = the percentage of capital not owned by substantial shareholders (i.e. 
shareholders who own more than 3% of the voting capital), calculated at the start of the 
financial year. Sources: Consob database for Italian firms and annual reports for UK firms.  
Outside shareholders’ attendance = the percentage of voting shares owned by the outside 
shareholders (i.e. shareholders who are not either controlling shareholders or directors of the 
firm) that voted for the remuneration resolution at the previous annual general meeting. 
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Sources: minutes of shareholders’ meetings for Italian firms and the Manifest database for 
UK firms.  
Media coverage = number of articles related to a firm's directors’ remuneration published in 
the main national newspapers during the previous year. Searches on the Factiva database 
were performed to identify directors’ remuneration-related news (Laksmana, 2008; Liu, 
Taylor, 2008) on the main national newspapers in Italy (Il Sole 24 Ore, Corriere della Sera, 
La Repubblica, and La Stampa) and the UK (Financial Times, The Time, The Guardian, and 
The Daily Telegraph)5. Source: Factiva database. 
CEO remuneration = total amount of remuneration the CEO received in the previous 
financial year. Source: firms’ annual reports. 
CEO remuneration change = the percentage variation of the remuneration the CEO received 
in the year analysed compared with that received in the previous financial year. Source: 
firms’ annual reports. 
Market performance = the percentage variation of the share value at the start of the financial 
year compared with the share value at the start of the previous financial year. Source: 
Amadeus database. 
Dissenting votes = a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if there was at least one outside 
shareholder who either abstained or voted against the remuneration resolution at the previous 
annual general meeting and 0 otherwise. Sources: minutes of shareholders’ meetings for 
Italian firms and Manifest database for UK firms.   
 
3.3.4. Control variables 
A review of the literature on voluntary disclosure led to the decision to include the following 
control variables in the multiple regression models for testing our hypotheses:  
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- Firm size. Larger firms provide more extensive disclosure than smaller firms as they are 
more likely to face political costs and have superior information systems to invest in 
corporate reporting and consequent disclosure (e.g., Cooke, 1989, 1992; Wallace & Naser, 
1995, Giner Inchausti, 1997; Byrd et al., 1998; Robb et al., 2001; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 
2005). This was measured as the market capitalization of the firm at the start of the financial 
year. Source: Thomson One Banker database.  
- Profitability. The level of firms’ profitability may influence the level of disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration as most remuneration schemes are based heavily on profitability 
(Murphy, 1999). Profitability was estimated as the Return on Assets (ROA) at the end of the 
previous financial year. Source: Amadeus database. 
- Financial leverage. Firms with higher leverage typically have higher agency costs and may 
attempt to reduce these costs through increased disclosure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
However, the agency problem and the consequent need to disguise remuneration packages 
might reduce the level of disclosure of directors’ remuneration (Bebchuk et al., 2002). This 
equals the percentage ratio of the value of total debts to total assets at the start of the financial 
year. Source: Amadeus database. 
- Remuneration complexity. Firms with complex directors’ remuneration structures are more 
prone to potential disclosure problems, thus they are more likely to have additional 
deficiencies in disclosure (Robinson et al., 2011). It was measured as the total number of 
items applicable to the firm analysed divided by the total number of items in the index. 
- Industry. The industrial sector that a firm operates in may influence that firm disclosure 
policy, either because of industry-related, peer-influence or the need to conform to market 
expectations (e.g., Cooke, 1992; Botosan, 1997; Robb et al., 2001). Firms were, therefore, 
classified by using the one-digit SIC code. Source: Thomson One Banker database.  
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- AIM 6. AIM and FTSE firms are subject to different disclosure regulations. Thus, we 
considered whether the firm was listed on the AIM. The AIM variable is dichotomous and 
equals 1 if the firm was listed on the AIM and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics on firm’s characteristics  
Table 1 summarises the main characteristics of the Italian and UK firms analysed.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
By comparison with UK firms, Italian firms have a significantly lower level of remuneration 
complexity, with fewer items to be disclosed. This probably reflects the different ownership 
and control structure of the two countries, which, in turn, leads to remuneration playing a 
different role in reducing the agency problem. Italian firms have a more concentrated 
ownership structure. Outside shareholders’ meeting attendance and the presence of dissenting 
votes are significantly higher in UK firms. UK firms increase CEO compensation more than 
Italian firms, have a higher profitability and are followed by a higher number of financial 
analysts. There are only UK firms listed on the AIM7.  
 
4.2. Findings on overall disclosure  
Our findings show that UK FTSE firms provide a higher level of total disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration (TDI = 0.75) than UK AIM firms (TDI = 0.47) and Italian firms (TDI = 0.56). 
The total level of disclosure provided in both countries does not allow annual reports’ users 
to get a comprehensive picture of directors’ remuneration in terms of incentive mechanisms 
and the potential relationship between remuneration and performance. Users’ ability to 
evaluate remuneration arrangements is, thus, limited (see table 2). 
24 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Overall, there is extensive disclosure on the amount of remuneration paid to each director. In 
terms of remuneration policy, both Italian and UK firms provide information on the general 
policy adopted to pay directors (in both countries the average level of disclosure for this item 
is higher than 0.90) and on the link between pay and performance (in both countries the 
average level of disclosure for this item is close to 0.90). However, the relative importance of 
variable remuneration as compared to fixed remuneration is widely disclosed only by UK 
FTSE firms, which provide an average level of disclosure of 0.85. By contrast, the average 
level of disclosure for this item is less than 0.43 for Italian firms, and 0.07 for UK AIM firms. 
In both countries, firms provided little information about the peer-firms considered when 
setting up remuneration agreements. Indeed such information is never disclosed by Italian 
firms, and the average level of disclosure is 0.19 for UK FTSE firms and 0.02 for UK AIM 
firms. Scant disclosure also exists on the details of fees payable to directors for the roles held 
within the board. This was disclosed most by UK FTSE firms (the average level of disclosure 
for this item equals 0.43), followed by Italian firms (the average level of disclosure is less 
than 0.29) and UK AIM firms (the average level of disclosure equals 0.04).  
We found important differences in the disclosure of the criteria adopted when deciding on the 
remuneration components. Italian firms more commonly provide details on the design of 
termination payments; while UK FTSE firms disclosed more information on the design of 
salaries, share-based payments, bonus schemes and pension plans.  
Share-based payments were generally properly disclosed given the stringent regulatory 
requirements. By contrast, we found a considerably lower level of disclosure on bonuses in 
both countries. In particular, UK firms rarely disclosed their performance targets or the 
amount that directors can earn for each target level on bonus schemes (the average level of 
disclosure is less than 0.09). However, such items are generally disclosed for share-based 
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payments (the average level of disclosure is more than 0.90 for UK FTSE firms and around 
0.40 for AIM firms). Italian firms which gave bonuses provided limited information on the 
measures adopted to estimate directors’ performance (the average level of disclosure is less 
than 0.28). However, such information is generally disclosed by Italian firms for share-based 
payments (the average level of disclosure is respectively more than 0.65).  
 
4.3. Descriptive findings on voluntary disclosure and multivariate analysis  
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics about the voluntary disclosure index for Italian and 
UK firms.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
As reported in table 2 (paragraph 4.2), the most significant differences between Italian and 
UK firms concern items whose disclosure is fully voluntary (such as the design of salaries 
and bonus schemes and the peer-firms considered when setting-up remuneration policies). 
Table 3 reports that the level of voluntary disclosure of directors’ remuneration is 
significantly higher in the UK than in Italy (0.466 vs. 0.246, p < 0.001). The levels of the 
voluntary disclosure index and the differences between the two countries are also similar 
when we compare and contrast UK FTSE firms with their Italian counterparts (0.465 vs. 
0.247, p < 0.001), and UK AIM firms with their Italian counterparts (0.466 vs. 0.243, p < 
0.001). 
Table 4 reports the correlations between all the variables used in the analysis for the full 
sample (Panel A) the Italian sub-sample (Panel B) and the Italian sub-sample (Panel C). 
Some significant and highly correlated coefficients have been found between the independent 
variables. In particular, in the full sample the variables Country and Ownership Diffusion are 
highly positively correlated at 0.73, while in the UK sample the variables Outside 
shareholders’ attendance, Dissenting votes and AIM are highly correlated between each other 
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at nearly |0.80|. Despite the presence of these high correlations, multicollinearity is unlikely 
to be a concern as the VIF values (see table 5) are lower than 5 (Gujarati, 2003; Baum, 2006).  
Moreover, the series of additional analyses that have been done to address this issue (see p. 
28) give us the confidence that our results are not affected by the potential presence of 
multicollinearity.  
INSERT TABLE 4 
Table 5 reports the results of the regression analyses performed in order to test the 
hypotheses. Model 1 estimates the influence on the voluntary disclosure of the variable 
country (used to test hypothesis H1). Model 2 estimates the influence on the voluntary 
disclosure index of the independent firm-specific variables of interest, used to test the set of 
hypotheses H2 and H3, after controlling for other firm-specific variables. Model 3 analyses 
the joint effect of country-level and firm-specific variables. Model 4 and model 5 consider 
the effect of independent and control firm-specific variables on voluntary disclosure 
respectively in the Italian sub-sample and in the UK sub-sample. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
We found that country-level institutional characteristics have a significant influence in 
explaining the level of firms’ voluntary disclosure.  Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported: the 
extent of voluntary disclosure on directors’ remuneration is significantly higher in UK firms 
than in Italian firms. This is consistent with the different market orientation that characterises 
the UK corporate system and the Italian corporate system. 
After controlling for country-level institutional characteristics, we found that firm-specific 
incentives also have a significant influence on voluntary disclosure. The comparison between 
the adjusted R2 of model 1 (0.29) and the adjusted R2 of model 3 (0.45) shows that adding 
firm-specific variables increases the explanatory power provided by country-level 
characteristics. Firm-specific demand for information and firm-specific need of legitimacy 
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have a significant influence on the level of voluntary disclosure. However, the intensity of the 
influence played by such firm-specific variables on voluntary disclosure differs significantly 
between the two institutional settings analysed (see models 4 and 5 in table 5).  
Firm-specific demand for information significantly influences voluntary disclosure in the 
UK, but not in Italy. As shown in models 4 and 5, hypothesis H2a is supported only in the 
UK. UK firms with greater ownership diffusion disclose more voluntary information. This 
result is in line with agency theory, as UK firms are characterised by higher information 
asymmetry between directors and shareholders than Italian firms. Conversely, we found no 
significant  support to hypothesis H2b as the coefficient of outside shareholders’ attendance 
is positive and significant only when the two institutional settings are jointly analysed (see 
model 3), while it is still positive but not significant when Italian and UK firms are analysed 
separately (see models 4 and 5). 
Our results provide evidence that the need for legitimacy leads Italian and UK firms to 
disclose higher levels of voluntary information. The relationship between the need for 
legitimacy and voluntary disclosure depends on the country-level institutional characteristics. 
In Italy, it is the level of media coverage that prompts voluntary disclosure (H3a). By 
contrast, in the UK, firms are more likely to disclose more when they are poor market 
performers and/or there are dissenting votes on remuneration resolution (H3d and H3e). H3b 
and H3c are not supported. Neither the level of CEO remuneration nor its change seem to 
play a significant influence on voluntary disclosure. 
In addition, we found that firms with a lower level of remuneration complexity and AIM 
firms have a higher voluntary disclosure index.  
 
4.3.1. Additional analyses 
In order to control for the robustness of our results, we performed some additional analyses.  
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First, as our dependent variable is censored we used the TOBIT regression model instead of 
the OLS model. Results are consistent with those reported in table 5.  
Second, because previous studies (e.g., Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Laskmana, 2008, 
Allegrini & Greco, 2013) found that board governance is positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure, we also consider variables that estimate board independence in our model. In 
particular, we added the following variables to models 2, 3, 4 and 5: board independence 
(percentage of independent directors on the board at the end of the previous year), CEO 
duality (equals 1 if the CEO is also the chair at the end of the previous year, and 0 otherwise) 
and Institutional investors’ ownership (percentage of voting shares owned by institutional 
investors at the end of the previous year). These three governance variables do not seem to 
play any significant influence on voluntary disclosure.  
Third, as remuneration complexity is different between UK FTSE, UK AIM and Italian firms, 
we run a regression by considering only the Italian firms that have variable remuneration (i.e. 
share-based remuneration and/or bonuses) and their UK counterparts. Our results are 
consistent with those reported in table 5. 
Fourth, because UK listed firms are subject to different listing rules when they are listed on 
the AIM, rather than on the FTSE, we perform our regression models, excluding AIM firms 
and their Italian counterparts. This does not affect our findings. We then performed a full 
interactive regression model (8) that allows to take into account the potential moderating role 
of country-level factors on the relationship between firms’ voluntary disclosure and the firm-
specific variables used to test our hypotheses on the demand for information (H2) and the 
need for legitimacy (H3). Consistently with the results reported in table 5, this analysis 
supports our main findings. The influence played by the firm-specific demand for 
information and the firm-specific need for legitimacy on voluntary disclosure is moderated by 
the institutional context. 
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Fifth, in order to address the potential concerns about multicollinearity in the UK sub-sample 
(because of the high correlation between the variables Outside shareholders’ attendance, 
dissenting votes and AIM), we performed three additional regression analyses in which we 
dropped two of the highly correlated variables. In the first analysis, we dropped the variables 
Dissenting votes and AIM, in the second the variables Outside shareholders’ attendance and 
AIM, and in the third analysis the variables Outside shareholders’ attendance and Dissenting 
votes. Consistently with the results reported in table 5, the coefficient of ownership diffusion 
and dissenting votes are still positive and significant and the coefficient of market 
performance is negative and significant.  
Finally, our study relies on a standard OLS regression approach in which variables are 
assumed to be exogenously determined. As some of the variables (e.g. voluntary disclosure 
and ownership diffusion) might be endogenously determined, we assessed whether or not 
interaction exists between such variables, by using a Hausman test. We did not find any 
evidence of endogeneity. Such a result is in line with the arguments of La Porta et al. (1999) 
and Liu and Magnan (2011): ownership structures in European countries are relatively stable 
over time. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper contributes to the academic disclosure literature (e.g., Marston & Shrives, 1991; 
Botosan, 1997; Giner Inchausti, 1997; Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Patel et al., 2003; 
Prencipe; 2004; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Markarian et al., 2007) by analysing a disclosure 
decision that reflects a potential conflict of interest between directors and outside 
shareholders. It extends the limited, but emerging, literature on directors’ remuneration 
disclosure (Chizema, 2008; Liu & Taylor, 2008; Laksmana, 2008; Laksmana et al., 2012) by 
exploring how and to what extent Italian and UK listed firms disclose directors’ remuneration 
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practices. It also investigates whether country-level institutional characteristics and firm-
specific incentives, such as the demand for information from investors and the need for 
legitimacy, are associated with the level of voluntary disclosure.  
Our findings support the arguments that firm’s behaviour is a combination of ‘idiosyncratic 
utility functions’ with functions that are ‘socially imposed’ (Wiseman et al., 2012) and that 
voluntary disclosure is multidimensional and driven by complementary forces (e.g., Cormier 
et al., 2005). 
In line with previous literature (e.g., Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Markarian et al., 
2007), we find that the extent of voluntary disclosure on directors’ remuneration is associated 
with country-level institutional characteristics: voluntary disclosure is significantly higher in 
the UK than in Italy. This may be due to the different market-orientation and the fact that in 
the UK executive remuneration has been the subject of scrutiny since the 1990s (e.g. Cadbury 
Report, 1992; Greenbury Report, 1995), while in Italy such scrutiny has emerged only in the 
last decade (Ferrarini et al., 2009). 
This study also contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature related to firm-specific 
incentives (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Laksmana, 2008; Liu & Taylor, 2008). In particular, we find 
support for agency and legitimacy theories. Voluntary disclosure is positively related to the 
level of ownership diffusion in the UK, but not in Italy, given the different agency problems 
that characterise Italian firms. Both UK and Italian firms provide more detailed information 
on directors’ remuneration when they have a higher need for legitimacy. These findings 
provide new evidence that legitimacy arguments may be extended to voluntary disclosure 
issues that are highly contested, although not necessarily related to social and environmental 
issues (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004; Chizema, 2008; Liu & Taylor, 2008).  
It is worth noting that firm-specific incentives to disclose information differ according to the 
institutional setting in which a firm operates. In a market-oriented corporate system, such as 
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the UK, incentives mostly come from market pressures (such as the firm’s ownership 
diffusion, market performance and shareholders’ dissent). By contrast, in a relationship-based 
corporate system, such as Italy, market performance is unlikely to influence firms’ strategic 
decisions (Brunello et al. 2003) and firm-specific incentives seems to be represented by the 
media. Media could affect firms’ reputation and compromise their relational capital.    
Last but not least, our findings suggest that the disclosure provided in both countries does not 
allow an annual report’s user to get a comprehensive picture about directors’ remuneration, in 
terms of incentive mechanisms and the potential relationship between remuneration and 
performance (Bebchuk & Jackson, 2005). Bonuses, an important element of directors’ 
remuneration, are poorly disclosed in both countries. In contrast with share-based payments, 
which were generally properly disclosed and whose disclosure was mainly mandatory, 
disclosure on bonuses is mainly voluntary. Information could easily be provided, as the 
design of bonuses packages is less complex than the design of share-based payments. Full 
disclosure about all relevant items needs to be required, otherwise firms may design their 
directors’ remuneration packages in accordance to what it is (and what it is not) required to 
be disclosed (Bebchuk et al, 2002). We, therefore, recommend policymakers to mandate a 
detailed disclosure for bonus schemes in the same way, as for share-based payments. 
Moreover, we recommend that it should be mandatory for listed firms to disclose all relevant 
information about directors’ remuneration. This need has been partly recognised by the 
Italian policymaker that has mandated additional disclosure since 2012. Additional disclosure 
has also been mandated for AIM firms since 2010. However, further improvement seems to 
be needed. 
We acknowledge that this study has some limitations which, in turn, suggest opportunities for 
future research. First, we examine directors’ remuneration disclosure in two countries and 
while we are able to leverage the generalisability of our findings thanks to the different 
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institutional characteristics of the two countries, a more comprehensive portrait would be 
obtained by studying additional countries. Second, our sample examines disclosure for a 
single year in which firms were severely hit by the global financial crisis. This choice 
enhances internal validity, but consequently treats disclosure as a static concept. Future 
studies could encompass a longitudinal dynamic model in which variation in disclosure could 
be associated to variation in the disclosure drivers. They could also investigate whether the 
level of disclosure and the disclosure drivers are influenced by the global economic cycle. 
Third, although we used lagged variables and the standard diagnostic procedure did not show 
any evidence of endogeneity, our study might not perfectly account for any potentially 
endogenous relations. However, this limitation is common to the whole disclosure literature 
(e.g., Palepu & Healy, 2001; Bassett et al, 2007; Teixeira Lopes & Lima Rodrigues, 2007; 
Patelli & Prencipe, 2007, Liu & Taylor, 2008; Laksmana et al., 2012). Last, but not least, our 
study focused on the level of disclosure provided by firms, but not whether (and how) firms 
‘managed’ remuneration disclosures, through impression management techniques (Laksmana 
et al, 2012; Mangen & Magnan, 2012). Further comparative research might address this 
issue. 
                                                          
Notes 
1
 Directors’ remuneration comprises both executive and non-executive remuneration. This paper considers the disclosure of 
both. However, given the material difference in the overall amounts generally paid to executive and non-executive directors, 
concerns about directors’ disclosure are usually about executive directors’ remuneration. See table 2 for a full list of items 
considered. 
2
 TUF (acronym for “Testo Unico sulla Finanza”) is the Italy’s Company act that regulates listed firms.   
3
 AIM companies were required to provide information on the aggregate remuneration of directors and on the remuneration 
of the highest paid director, when such remuneration was equal or higher than £ 200,000. 
4
 The full list of items that construct the disclosure index is reported in table 2. The rules of codification are available from 
the authors upon request.  
5
 We made the following query into the database:  
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COMPANY NAME and director* and compensation OR COMPANY NAME and director* and remuneration OR COMPANY 
NAME and director* and bonus* OR COMPANY NAME and director* and "stock option*" OR COMPANY NAME and 
director* and "share award*" OR COMPANY NAME and director* and "CEO pay" OR COMPANY NAME and director* and 
"director* pay" OR COMPANY NAME and director* and "executive* pay" OR COMPANY NAME and director* and 
"termination payment*" OR COMPANY NAME and director* and "restricted share*" OR COMPANY NAME and executive* 
and compensation OR COMPANY NAME and executive* and bonus* OR COMPANY NAME and executive* and remuneration 
OR COMPANY NAME and executive* and "stock option*" OR COMPANY NAME and executive* and "share award*" OR 
COMPANY NAME and executive* and "restricted share*" OR COMPANY NAME and executive* and "CEO pay" OR 
COMPANY NAME and executive* and "director* pay" OR COMPANY NAME and executive* and "executive* pay" OR 
COMPANY NAME and executive* and "termination payment*" OR COMPANY NAME and CEO and compensation OR 
COMPANY NAME and CEO and remuneration OR COMPANY NAME and CEO and bonus* OR COMPANY NAME and 
CEO and "stock option*" OR COMPANY NAME and CEO and "CEO pay" OR COMPANY NAME and CEO and "director* 
pay" OR COMPANY NAME and CEO and "executive* pay" OR COMPANY NAME and CEO and "termination payment*" OR 
COMPANY NAME and CEO and "share award*" OR COMPANY NAME and CEO and "restricted share*" OR COMPANY 
NAME and compensation OR COMPANY NAME and remuneration OR COMPANY NAME and bonus* OR COMPANY 
NAME and "stock option*" OR COMPANY NAME and "CEO pay" OR COMPANY NAME and "director* pay" OR 
COMPANY NAME and "executive* pay" OR COMPANY NAME and "termination payment*" OR COMPANY NAME and 
"share award*" OR COMPANY NAME and "restricted share*". 
6
 We considered AIM as control variable only in the UK sub-sample as there was no AIM in Italy at the time of the analysis.  
7
 This is because the AIM has been established in Italy only in 2012. 
8
 The model used is: 
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Table 1 – Main characteristics of the sample (Sample size = 234 firms). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Levels of significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p. < 0.05; * p < 0.10. 
 
Variables are defined as follows:   
Ownership diffusion - the percentage of capital not owned by substantial shareholders (i.e. shareholders who own more than 3% of the voting capital), calculated at the start of the financial year; 
Outside shareholders’ attendance - the percentage of voting shares owned by the outside shareholders (i.e. shareholders who are not either controlling shareholders or directors of the firm) that voted 
for the remuneration resolution at the previous annual general meeting; Media coverage - number of articles related to a firm’s directors’ remuneration published in the main national newspapers 
during the previous year; CEO remuneration – total amount of remuneration the CEO received in the previous financial year; CEO remuneration change - the percentage variation of the 
remuneration the CEO received in the year analysed compared with that received in the previous financial year; Market performance - the percentage variation of the share value at the start of the 
financial year compared with the share value at the start of the previous financial year; Dissenting votes - dichotomous variable that equals 1 if there was at least one outside shareholder who either 
abstained or voted against on the remuneration resolution at the previous annual general meeting, and 0 otherwise; Firm size - market capitalization of the firm at the start of the financial year; 
Profitability – ROA at the end of the previous financial year; Financial leverage - percentage ratio of the value of total debts to total assets at the start of the financial year; Remuneration complexity 
- total number of items applicable to the firm analysed divided by the total number of items in the index; Financial analysts’ coverage - total number of financial analysts that published at least one 
report, during the previous financial year, on the firm analysed; Industry - set of dichotomous variables equal to 1 if the firm was classified into the i one-digit SIC code; AIM - dichotomous variable 
that equals 1 if the firm was listed on the AIM and 0 otherwise.  
 MEAN  MEDIAN MIN MAX STAND. DEV 
  ITA UK  ITA UK ITA UK ITA UK ITA UK 
Ownership diffusion (%) 45.40 79.69 *** 43.67 85.21 11.51 15.41 88.92 99.21 16.49 15.61 
Outside shareholders’ attendance (%) 10.95 35.35 *** 6.81 40.62 0.00 0.00 70.32 84.96 12.41 30.78 
Media coverage   0.97 0.28  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.00 14.00 3.21 1.74 
CEO remuneration (€ thousand)  1,043.76 885.01  467.78 661.70 30.00 82.62 8.265.00 3,827.54 1,347.05 7,615.87 
CEO remuneration change (%) -0.92 11.93 * -0.19 3.77 -94.36 -73.74 221.43 210.76 46.32 49.51 
Market performance (%) -49.15 -43.00 † -51.65 -44.55 -97.40 -96.38 42.74 62.50 23.74 29.78 
Dissenting votes 0.38 0.68 ***         
Firm size  (€ million)  1,184.25 1,819.30  101.18 108.43 2.93 2.17 60,639.05 141,362.20 6,186.61 13,163.49 
Profitability  0.03 -0.04 * 0.04 0.05 -0.37 -2.10 0.27 0.38 0.09 0.31 
Financial leverage (%) 64.03 58.90  66.02 60.75 9.98 2.55 104.30 185.20 18.48 28.45 
Remuneration complexity 0.71 0.83 *** 0.78 0.90 0.37 0.29 0.93 0.95 0.17 0.13 
Financial analysts’ coverage 2.87 5.04 *** 1 4 0 0 23 33 4.49 5.91 
Industries (%) 
  
 
        
 - Agriculture, forestry and fishing  2.56 2.56  
        
 - Mining 0.85 0.85  
        
 - Light manufacturing 14.53 14.53  
        
 - Heavy manufacturing 35.90 35.90  
        
 - Utilities 10.27 10.27  
        
 - Trade 5.98 5.98  
        
 - Real Estate 9.40 9.40  
        
 - Services 20.51 20.51  
        AIM  0.00 0.36 *** 
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Table 2 – Average level of disclosure of specific items and overall disclosure 
  Type of disclosure FTSE Match-paired 
AIM  
Match-paired 
 
 
Ita UK FTSE AIM Ita UK Ita UK 
DISCLOSURE OF SPECIFIC ITEMS        
A. REMUNERATION POLICY        
 Directors' remuneration policy M M V 0.95 1.00 0.91 0.93 
 Information on the Pay-performance link M M V 0.95 0.99 0.88 0.91 
 Relative importance of fixed and variable components V M V 0.33 0.85 0.43 0.07 
 Peer groups considered V V V 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.02 
B DESIGN OF SALARY AND FEES        
 Criteria for setting-up of salaries V V V 0.01 0.85 0.00 0.38 
 Fees payable to directors for being director, committee member, chair or SID V V V 0.29 0.43 0.19 0.04 
C. DESIGN OF BONUS SCHEMES        
 Adopted (Yes/No) V V V 0.74 0.95 0.64 0.62 
 How the scheme contributes to the firm's long term interest V V V 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Performance criteria adopted V V V 0.43 0.87 0.34 0.39 
 Performance measure(s) adopted V V V 0.14 0.53 0.28 0.13 
 Weight of each performance measure adopted V V V 0.04 0.39 0.20 0.10 
 Performance target for each performance measure adopted V V V 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.05 
 Amount earned for each target level of each performance measure adopted V V V 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.04 
 Aim of the bonus V V V 0.17 0.53 0.00 0.13 
 Rationale for the performance criteria V V V 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.03 
 Sufficient information on deferment periods V V V 0.18 0.89 0.16 0.49 
D. SHARE-BASED PAYMENTS (SBP)        
 GRANTED DURING THE YEAR:        
 Number of SBPs M M V 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.91 
 Exercise price M M V 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.83 
 Vesting period  M M V 0.85 0.91 0.67 0.67 
 Exercise period  M M V 0.88 1.00 0.67 0.64 
 Beneficiaries M M V 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.85 
 Market price M M V 0.70 0.83 0.83 0.58 
 Performance-conditioned vesting   M M V 0.80 0.97 1.00 0.52 
 How the performance criteria contributes to the firm's long term interest V V V 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Information on the performance-conditioned vesting M M V 0.78 0.97 1.00 0.44 
 Performance measure(s) adopted  M M V 0.67 0.97 1.00 0.42 
 Weight of each performance measure adopted M M V 0.44 0.93 0.75 0.42 
 Target level for each performance measure adopted M M V 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.40 
 Amount earned for each target level of each performance measure adopted  M M V 0.33 0.92 0.25 0.40 
 Rationale for the performance criteria  V V V 0.11 0.33 0.25 0.06 
 Policy regarding shares' retention  M M V 0.56 0.45 1.00 0.06 
 Aim of the SBP M M V 0.90 0.72 1.00 0.44 
 EXERCISED  DURING THE YEAR:        
 Number of SBPs  M M V 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.88 
 For each SBP exercised the number of shares involved M M V 0.63 1.00 0.67 0.33 
 Exercise price M M V 0.63 1.00 0.50 0.33 
 UNEXERCISED  AT THE END OF THE YEAR:        
 Number of SBPs M M V 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.83 
 Exercise price  M M V 0.92 0.99 0.81 0.84 
 Vesting period  M M V 0.77 0.86 0.73 0.62 
 Exercise period  M M V 0.81 0.97 0.73 0.67 
 Beneficiaries  M M V 0.88 0.99 0.85 0.81 
 Performance-conditioned vesting  M M V 0.72 0.94 0.62 0.55 
 How the performance criteria contributes to the firm's long term interest V V V 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Information on the performance-conditioned vesting M M V 0.64 0.89 0.50 0.27 
 Performance measure(s) adopted  M M V 0.52 0.86 0.46 0.26 
 Weight of each performance measure adopted M M V 0.32 0.85 0.46 0.26 
 Target level for each performance measure adopted M M V 0.14 0.76 0.33 0.26 
 Amount earned for each target level of each performance measure adopted  M M V 0.27 0.74 0.33 0.26 
 Rationale for the performance criteria  V V V 0.09 0.27 0.00 0.05 
 Policy regarding shares' retention  M M V 0.56 0.41 0.58 0.04 
 Aim of the SBP M M V 0.92 0.65 0.77 0.27 
E. PENSION SCHEMES        
 Type: defined-benefit scheme/defined-contribution scheme V M V 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.79 
 Changes in the accrued benefits during the year and/or details of the V M V 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 
F. EXECUTIVES’ CONTRACT AND TERMINATION PAYMENTS        
 Duration of contracts M M V 1.00 0.69 0.98 0.30 
 Applicable notice period V M V 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.63 
 Details of provisions for termination payments M M V 0.86 0.71 0.76 0.18 
G. REMUNERATION PAID TO EACH DIRECTOR        
 Total remuneration M M V 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 
 Salary  M M V 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.77 
 Profit sharing and/or bonus payments M M V 0.89 0.97 0.83 0.58 
 Termination  payment to each executive who left the firm during the year M M V 1.00 0.73 0.67 0.63 
 Estimated value of benefits in-kind  M M V 0.81 0.96 0.71 0.58 
 Type of benefits in-kind V V V 0.13 0.48 0.06 0.26 
 Amount earned by exercising SBPs during the year V V V 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.89 
 No of SBPs granted during the year M M V 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.86 
 No of SBPs exercised during the year M M V 0.95 1.00 0.98 0.88 
 No of SBPs unexercised at the end of the year M M V 0.95 1.00 0.95 0.86 
 Details of "Other remuneration" V V V 0.58 0.67 0.57 0.17 
H. REMUNERATION SECTION IN THE ANNUAL REPORT (Yes/No) V M V 0.64 0.87 0.62 0.66 
TOTAL DISCLOSURE INDEX (TDI)    0.56 0.75 0.55 0.47 
No Obs (Sample size = 234 firms)    75 75 42 42 
Legend: M = Mandatory information; V = Voluntary information. 
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Table 3 –Voluntary disclosure index (VDI): descriptive results 
 
No 
Obs 
         Mean          Median Min Max Stand. Dev 
 ITA UK   ITA UK   ITA UK ITA UK ITA UK 
FULL SAMPLE 234  0.246   0.466   ***   0.259   0.500   ***   0.020   0.059   0.500   0.904   0.127   0.161  
FTSE MATCH-PAIR  150  0.247   0.465   ***   0.259   0.500   ***   0.020   0.059 0.500   0.710   0.123   0.135  
AIM MATCH-PAIR 84  0.243   0.466   ***   0.250   0.474   ***   0.042  0.076   0.500   0.904   0.134   0.202  
 
Levels of significance: *** p. < 0.01. 
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Where:  
VDIi  is the voluntary disclosure index of the firm i;  
vdij is the value for a voluntary disclosure index item j, for firm i.  
mj is the number of voluntary disclosure items which are relevant to firm i and were actually disclosed, and  
nj is the maximum number of voluntary disclosure items that can be disclosed by firm i given the elements 
that are comprised in the directors’ remuneration package.  
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Table 4 – Pearson correlation Matrix between the Voluntary disclosure index and the independent and control variables 
 
Panel A  - Full sample  (n. obs = 230)  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
 
1. Voluntary disclosure index (a) 1 
                     2. Country (UK = 1; ITA = 0) 0.54 1 
                    3. Ownership diffusion 0.44 0.73 1 
                   4. Outside shareholders' attendance 0.35 0.46 0.56 1 
                  5. Media coverage (a) 0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.07 1 
                 
6. CEO remuneration (a) 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.17 1 
                7. CEO remuneration change 0.04 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.00 -0.25 1 
               8. Market performance -0.03 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.04 -0.05 0.00 1 
              9. Dissenting votes 0.29 0.30 0.37 0.60 0.21 0.14 0.07 0.07 1 
             
10. Firm size (a) 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.42 0.53 0.25 -0.02 0.25 0.50 1 
            11. Profitability -0.09 -0.15 -0.07 0.15 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.18 0.22 0.28 1 
           12. Financial leverage -0.05 -0.11 0.02 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.12 -0.10 0.24 0.18 0.15 1 
          13. Remuneration complexity  -0.08 0.38 0.44 0.41 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.37 0.33 0.08 0.16 1 
         14. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.25 1 
        15. Mining 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.02 1 
       16. Light manufacturing 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.09 -0.12 0.11 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 1 
      17. Heavy manufacturing -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.26 0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.31 1 
     18. Utilities 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.29 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 0.23 0.02 0.12 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 -0.25 1 
    19. Trade 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.19 -0.09 1 
   20. Real Estate -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13 -0.24 -0.11 -0.08 1 
  21. Services -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 -0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.24 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.21 -0.38 -0.17 -0.13 -0.16 1 
 
Panel B  - Italian sample  (n. obs = 116)  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
 
1. Voluntary disclosure index (a) 1 
                     2. Country (UK = 1; ITA = 0) . .  
                    3. Ownership diffusion -0.12 . 1 
                   4. Outside shareholders' attendance 0.12 . 0.39 1 
                  5. Media coverage (a) 0.11 . 0.23 0.19 1 
                 
6. CEO remuneration (a) 0.05 . -0.06 0.08 0.26 1 
                7. CEO remuneration change 0.01 . 0.08 0.16 0.05 -0.36 1 
               8. Market performance 0.05 . -0.13 0.00 0.03 -0.18 0.03 1 
              9. Dissenting votes 0.09 . 0.13 0.17 0.32 0.29 -0.03 -0.01 1 
             10. Firm size (a) -0.02 . 0.06 0.11 0.61 0.38 -0.06 0.23 0.49 1 
            11. Profitability -0.16 . -0.07 -0.22 0.13 0.00 -0.02 0.30 0.17 0.47 1 
           12. Financial leverage -0.03 . 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.17 -0.10 -0.18 0.19 -0.05 -0.13 1 
          13. Remuneration complexity  -0.60 . 0.17 -0.05 0.24 0.23 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.31 0.32 0.20 1 
         14. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.08 . -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 0.00 0.12 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.19 -0.18 1 
        15. Mining 0.05 . -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.05 0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 1 
       16. Light manufacturing 0.06 . -0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 1 
      17. Heavy manufacturing -0.06 . -0.09 -0.22 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.14 -0.14 -0.03 0.15 -0.20 0.03 -0.07 -0.12 -0.31 1 
     18. Utilities 0.08 . 0.05 0.26 0.26 0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.20 0.23 -0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 -0.25 1 
    19. Trade -0.06 . 0.20 0.08 -0.06 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.19 -0.09 1 
   20. Real Estate -0.02 . 0.03 0.15 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13 -0.24 -0.11 -0.08 1 
  21. Services -0.04 . -0.04 -0.01 -0.13 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 -0.13 -0.22 -0.10 0.12 0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.21 -0.38 -0.17 -0.13 -0.16 1 
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Panel C  - UK sample  (No obs = 114)  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1. Voluntary disclosure index (a) 1 
                     2. Country (UK = 1; ITA = 0) . .  
                    3. Ownership diffusion 0.32 . 1 
                   4. Outside shareholders' attendance 0.18 . 0.40 1 
                  5. Media coverage (a) 0.07 . 0.07 0.10 1 
                 
6. CEO remuneration (a)  -0.08 . 0.01 0.02 0.04 1 
                7. CEO remuneration change -0.10 . 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 1 
               8. Market performance -0.28 . -0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 -0.04 1 
              9. Dissenting votes 0.25 . 0.34 0.79 0.13 -0.05 0.10 0.07 1 
             
10. Firm size (a) 0.12 . 0.27 0.65 0.45 0.12 0.01 0.27 0.56 1 
            11. Profitability 0.04 . 0.10 0.31 -0.10 -0.09 0.05 0.20 0.36 0.27 1 
           12. Financial leverage 0.04 . 0.10 0.32 0.16 0.02 0.29 -0.05 0.36 0.32 0.20 1 
          13. Remuneration complexity  0.06 . 0.39 0.54 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.51 0.42 0.12 0.26 1 
         14. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.00 . -0.19 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.40 1 
        15. Mining 0.01 . -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.08 -0.02 1 
       16. Light manufacturing 0.05 . 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.08 0.10 -0.17 0.14 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 1 
      17. Heavy manufacturing -0.02 . 0.04 0.04 -0.11 -0.09 0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.30 0.13 -0.07 -0.12 -0.31 1 
     18. Utilities 0.08 . 0.02 0.06 0.34 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.17 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 -0.25 1 
    19. Trade 0.12 . 0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.19 -0.09 1 
   20. Real Estate -0.06 . -0.14 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13 -0.24 -0.11 -0.08 1 
  21. Services -0.12 . -0.07 -0.20 -0.10 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.10 -0.25 0.15 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.21 -0.38 -0.17 -0.13 -0.16 1 
 22. AIM segment  -0.06 . -0.33 -0.80 -0.14 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10 -0.83 -0.64 -0.31 -0.37 -0.53 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.24 1 
 
 
The bold value indicates statistical significance at p < 0.05.  
 
Note:  
(a) Calculated using the natural logarithm avoid heteroskedasticity. 
 
See table 1 for the definition of the variables. 
 
One Italian firm and one UK firm were dropped because of the lack of data about CEO remuneration. Two UK firms were dropped because of the lack of data about outside 
shareholders’ attendance and dissenting votes. 
 
The control variable AIM has been included only in the correlation matrix for the UK sub-sample as in Italy the AIM has been established only in 2012.  
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Table 5 – Regression results on voluntary disclosure index.  
   
  FULL SAMPLE Italy UK 
  Hypotheses and 
expected signs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Coefficient Variables  T T T T T 
α0 Constant  
 
-30.55 *** 2.01 ** -1.1   4.09 *** 2.88 *** 
δ Country (UK = 1; ITA = 0) H1 + 9.87 ***     7.24 ***       
β1 Ownership diffusion H2a +   
 
5.84 *** 0.96   -0.99   2.51 ** 
β2 Outside shareholders’ attendance  H2b +   
 
2.59 *** 1.82 * 0.78   -0.08  
β3 Media coverage(a) H3a +   
 
1.10 
 
1.82 * 2.99 *** -0.08  
β4 CEO remuneration(a) H3b +   
 
0.77 
 
-0.06   0.73   0.47  
β5 CEO remuneration change H3c +   
 
0.26 
 
-0.47   0.85   -1.34  
β6 Market performance H3d -   
 
0.15 
 
-1.28   0.41   -3.09 *** 
β7 Dissenting votes  H3e +   
 
2.56 ** 2.24 * 0.51   3.32 *** 
γ1 Firm size(a)  
 
  
 
-0.93 
 
0.13   -0.49   1.36  
γ2 Profitability   
 
  
 
-1.04 
 
-0.05   0.74   0.04  
γ3 Financial leverage  
 
  
 
-1.22 
 
-0.13   0.66   -0.05  
γ4 Remuneration complexity  
 
  
 
-6.17 *** -7.58 *** -9.61 *** -1.01  
γ5 AIM   
 
  
    
      2.66 *** 
 
Industry   
 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N. Obs  
 
234 230 230 116 114 
 
Mean VIF  
   
1.63 1.81 1.85 2.24 
 
Max VIF  
   
2.60 2.71 4.30 4.99 
 
Adj (R2)  
 
0.2925 0.3231 0.4522 0.504 0.1944 
  F  
 
0.3231 *** 10.94 *** 16.75 *** 11.62 *** 3.27 *** 
 
Levels of significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p. < 0.05; * p < 0.10. 
 
Note:  
(a) Calculated using the natural logarithm avoid heteroskedasticity. 
α is the coefficient for constant;  
β is the coefficient for the independent explanatory variables;  
γ is the coefficient of the independent control variables;  
δ is the coefficient for measuring the country effect.  
 
See table 1 for the definition of the variables. 
One Italian firm and one UK firm were dropped because of the lack of data about CEO remuneration. Two UK firms were dropped because of the lack of data about outside 
shareholders’ attendance and dissenting votes. 
The control variable AIM segment has been included only in the regression analysis for the UK sub-sample, as in Italy the AIM has been established only in 2012.  
 
